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 Currently the Antitrust Modernization Commission is considering 
numerous proposals for adjusting the relationship between federal antitrust 
authority and state regulation.  This essay examines two areas that have 
produced a significant amount of state-federal conflict: state regulation of 
insurance and the "state action" immunity for general state regulation.  It argues 
that no principle of efficiency, regulatory theory, or federalism justifies the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which creates an antitrust immunity for state regulation 
of insurance.  What few benefits the Act confers could be fully realized by an 
appropriate interpretation of the state action doctrine.  Second, the current 
formulation of the antitrust state action doctrine creates approximately the correct 
balance between state and federal authority where competition is concerned, 
although both its "clear articulation" and "active supervision" prongs need to be 
strengthened and refined.  In addition, basing state action immunity on the 
degree to which a state imposes the burden of in-state monopoly on out-of-state 
interests very likely comes with greater costs than any benefit that is likely to 
result. 
 FEDERALISM AND ANTITRUST REFORM 
 
 Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
Introduction: State Regulation and Federal Antitrust 
 
 Ever since the Sherman Act was passed, the interaction between federal 
antitrust policy and state law making has been controversial.  The framers of the 
Sherman Act clearly did not intend to displace all state regulation of the 
economy.2  To be sure, under the "dual federalism" that prevailed in the 1890s, 
Congress could have done little else.3  In that era any attempt to regulate purely 
intrastate economic affairs would have exceeded Congressional power under the 
Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court's decision in the Sugar Trust case a 
few years later established.4  For their part, the states were empowered to 
regulate purely instrastate transactions, but not those with a significant interstate 
impact.5  Within this model there were very few perceived overlaps6 and 
                                                 
1.  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, University of Iowa College of Law. 
2.  See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); and 1 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&102, 216 (3d ed. 2006); Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and 
American Law, 1836-1937 at 241-295 (1991); James May, The Role of the States in the 
First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust Policy, 59 Antitrust L.J. 
93 (1990); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The 
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
495 (1987). 
 
 Cf. R.E. Spriggs Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 37 Cal.App.3d 653, 660, 112 Cal.Rptr. 585, 
589 (1974) ("history of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes it clear that Congress did not 
intend that the federal legislation preempt parallel state efforts to control unfair competitive 
practices").   
3.  See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-92.  The classic statements concerning the 
limitations on state and federal power under the Commerce Clause in the nineteenth 
century are Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall, Taney and Waite, 
chs. 1 & 2 (1937); and Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 
1 (1950).  For a good, brief history see Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying 
the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1447, 1454 (1995). 
4.  United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Sherman Act does not reach 
sugar trust that manufactured in multiple states when the restraint was not claimed to be in 
the interstate shipment of sugar). 
5.  See Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Rwy. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (while state 
could regulate rates of a completely intrastate rail shipment, it lacked the power to regulate 
any portion of an interstate shipment, even that part contained entirely within the state).  
See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-84. 
6.  Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note 2 at 79-92. 
Congress really had no choice but to recognize the power of the states to engage 
in economic regulation within their own boundaries. 
 
 Nevertheless, even within this regime, conflicts could arise.  Already in 
1904 the Supreme Court had to face a "state action" defense to a government 
antitrust challenge.  The Northern Securities corporation had taken advantage of 
a provision of the New Jersey Corporation Act that permitted the creation of a 
holding company that held out-of-state assets.7  The result was a merger of the 
two most significant east-west interstate railroads in the northern part of the 
United States.  The defendants argued that the Sherman Act was not intended to 
overrun state law.  Because the merger in question was justified by state 
corporation laws it could not violate the antitrust laws.  However, the Sherman 
Act permitted the government to pursue "combinations" in restraint of trade, 
making no distinction between purely private combinations8 and those that were 
formed with the sanction of a state government.  The Supreme Court rejected 
this "state action" defense in only a few sentences, concluding that while the New 
Jersey statute permitted holding companies, there was no evidence that it was 
intended to permit anticompetitive combinations.  The Court also added that "It 
cannot be said that any state may give a corporation . . . authority to restrain 
interstate . . . commerce against the will of . . . Congress."9 
 
 The antitrust "state action"10 doctrine in its modern form was made 
necessary by the collapse of dual federalism in the 1940s, particularly with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Wickard v. Filburn,11 which expanded federal 
economic power to reach predominately intrastate transactions provided that 
they "affected" United States commerce.  At that point, significant conflict 
between federal antitrust and state regulation became possible.  The Supreme 
                                                 
7.  Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 326-327 (1904). 
8.  E.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (condemning 
privately created joint venture among railroads under Sherman Act); United States v. Joint-
Traffic Ass'n., 171 U.S. 505 (1898).  Both Trans-Missouri and Joint-Traffic involved joint 
"running arrangements," which were joint ventures that did not require the formation of a 
new corporation or the sanction of state corporate law. 
9.  Northern Securities, 193 U.S. at 346. 
10.  The antitrust "state action" doctrine is different from and much narrower than the 
Fourteenth Amendment state action doctrine, and the two are rarely confused.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine automatically extends to all states and government 
subdivisions, as well as their officials acting under color of state law and occasionally even 
private entities performing public functions.  In contrast, the antitrust state action immunity 
applies only where the requirements of clear articulation and active supervision of private 
conduct have been met.  All further references to "state action" in this paper are to the 
antitrust doctrine. 
11.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942). 
Court responded a year later with Parker v. Brown,12 which created the antitrust 
state action doctrine, immunizing a state-sanctioned agreement that reduced the 
output of California raisins. 
 
 While the state action doctrine was entirely a creation of the Supreme 
Court, the views of Congress during this period were largely sympathetic.  In 
South Eastern Underwriters, decided two years after Wickard and a year after 
Parker, the Supreme Court held that insurance transactions were within 
interstate commerce and thus within the reach of the Sherman Act.13  Congress 
then responded in 1945 with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which immunized the 
"business of insurance" from most federal legislation, including the antitrust 
laws.14  McCarran-Ferguson is significant in part because in 1945, when that 
statute was passed, Congress clearly did have the power to reach intrastate 
transactions with interstate effects, thus overriding inconsistent state mandates.  
However, Congress largely chose not to do so with respect to insurance, 
preferring at that time to leave most of its regulation to the states. 
 
 Thus in the space of four years in the early 1940s the Supreme Court and 
Congress established what has become the modern framework for 
understanding the relationship between federal antitrust policy and regulation by 
the states.  The question today is whether this framework still works, or whether it 
needs to be modernized or jettisoned completely.  This essay offers a few basic 
considerations and some suggestions for reform.  The considerations are these: 
 
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation and the Role of Antitrust 
 
 The relationship between federal antitrust policy and state economic 
regulation is driven in part by attitudes toward regulation.  Although the point is 
easily overstated, today we are less optimistic about regulation than we were a 
half century ago.  The state action exemption was formulated at a time when 
federal power was expanding rapidly and confidence in regulation was generally 
high.15  By contrast, in the last quarter century we have become much less 
confident in regulation at every government level.  The rise of public choice 
                                                 
12.  317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
13.  United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  The 
decision substantially overruled the Court's decision in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 
(1868), that insurance had an essentially intrastate character.  In Paul the Court concluded 
that a Virginia statute requiring out of state insurance companies to obtain a license before 
doing business in Virginia did not offend either the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the 
Commerce Clause. 
14.  59 Stat. 33 (1945), 61 Stat. 448 (1947), 15 U.S.C. ''1011, 1012. 
15.  On some of the historical perspective see 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &241 (3d ed. 2006). 
theory and the deregulation movement reflect different aspects of these 
changes.16  Just as these changes have occasioned less deference to federal 
regulation, they can do the same thing for state or local government regulation. 
 
 One is tempted to say that during this same period we have acquired 
more confidence about the role of antitrust as an alternative to affirmative 
regulation in producing efficient economic outcomes.  But that point is open to 
dispute, and some critics take just as dim a view of antitrust enforcement as they 
do of regulation.17  To be sure, deregulation has increased the domain of antitrust 
by removing regulatory immunities that once existed.18  As a result, antitrust is 
now applied in markets such as air passenger travel or telecommunications 
where there was once thought to be a substantial regulatory immunity.  But to 
say that antitrust's domain has expanded is not necessarily to say that our 
confidence level in antitrust enforcement has increased as confidence in 
regulation has declined.  One might as easily say that our confidence level in all 
types of government intervention in the market has declined, and that the decline 
cuts across both regulatory and antitrust policy. 
 
 Actually, the antitrust story is more nuanced than this.  While we have 
become far more skeptical about our once aggressive policies against 
exclusionary practices, vertical restraints and mergers, antitrust policy is as fierce 
as ever about naked cartels.  Problematically, however, the types of restraints for 
which state law regulatory immunity is sought run the full gamut.  Some state 
regulation condones fairly blatant collusion.19  However, antitrust challenges to 
state action are frequently brought under the weakest possible antitrust 
theories.20  For example, it is hard to see any antitrust violation in a city's order to 
the dominant cable company to restrain its expansion for a time so that the city 
                                                 
16.  See id., &241b2 (public choice); &241b3 (changes in economic theory arguing for 
deregulation).  More generally, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public 
Choice: a Critical Introduction (1991).  For specific application to regulation, see George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 3 (1971); and 
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 335 
(1974). 
17.  E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 
16 (1984). 
18.  See 1A Antitrust Law &241 (3d). 
19.  E.g., FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992) (noting weak state supervision 
of title insurance rate bureaus, leading effectively to unsupervised collusion); New England 
Motor Rate Bureau, Inc., 112 F.T.C. 200 (1989), vacated on other grounds, 908 F.2d 1064, 
1071 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar facts); Massachusetts Board of Registration of Optometry, 5 
Trade Reg. Rep. &22,555 (1988).  See 1A Antitrust Law &226c (3d). 
20.  See 1 Antitrust Law &228b (3d). 
might assess whether entry by rivals is appropriate;21 or a municipality's refusal 
to supply utilities to outlying areas that had not been annexed;22 or its decision to 
create its own cable television system rather than purchasing CATV services 
from a private firm.23  Many other state action cases involve challenges to such 
things as exclusive contracts, ordinarily treated as either exclusive dealing or 
tying.  The great majority of such arrangements are lawful even when the firm 
imposing the arrangement is a monopolist, and in many of these cases the 
hospital or similar publicly operated institution claiming the exemption was only 
one of many competitors.24  Still others are challenges to such practices as peer 
review which are rarely anticompetitive unless abused.25  Others involve 
standard setting or rule making that cannot be an antitrust violation because no 
benefit accrues to the organization making the rules.26 
 
 Some see the rise of public choice theory as a compelling reason for 
either narrowing the reach of the state action immunity or for removing the 
immunity for proven instances of regulatory capture.27  However, it is not clear to 
                                                 
21.  Community Communic. Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).  The 
municipal ordinance challenged as an antitrust violation delayed the territorial expansion of 
the plaintiff, the dominant incumbent cable firm, while the city council decided whether to 
open the field to additional competitors.  In all events, a dominant firm alleging that a 
restraint limited its power to expand its monopoly so that new rivals could be given an 
opportunity to come in is not a victim of antitrust injury.  See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo 
Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); and see 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law &337 (2d 2000). 
22.  Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985).  Placed in a private context, 
the claim in Hallie was tantamount to claiming that General Motors violated the antitrust 
laws by providing snow removal services only to its own properties, but not to adjoining 
properties that it did not own. 
23.  Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 963 (1992). 
24.  E.g., Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Company, LLC v. West Tennessee Healthcare, 
Inc., 414 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2005); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 
824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990). 
25.  E.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp., 980 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993). 
26.  Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1043 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 982 (1998) (state accountancy board promulgates rule 
prohibiting CPAs, its own members, from selling securities). 
27.  E.g., John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views 
on the Proper Role of Government, 72 Antitrust L.J. 1075 (2005).  Other good discussions 
include John Shephard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 
713 (1986); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. 
Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 Duke L.J. 618; William H. Page & John 
E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 189 (1993); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of 
me that antitrust tribunals need to respond in any programmatic way to changes 
in regulatory attitude.  Repairing imperfections in political processes is not 
antitrust's purpose.  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever 
authorized the use of antitrust as a wide ranging mandate to fix imperfections in 
government process.  Rather, the antitrust laws are explicitly designed to control 
private restraints.  Further, most serious abuses of government process are 
better remedied by laws that are more directly tailored for that purpose, such as 
those condemning bribery, financial abuses or other forms of corruption.  These 
laws do not carry antitrust's additional, significant proof requirements of market 
power and economic harm, and at least some of them are enforceable by 
criminal sanctions. 
 
 Public choice is relevant in another sense, however.  Public choice theory 
serves as a warning that many so-called "public" restraints are really private 
restraints by another name.  That message is two-fold: if a state or local 
government really authorizes and effectively supervises a private restraint, so be 
it.  Federal antitrust cannot intervene simply because federal tribunals believe 
that the regulation in question is ill-advised, inefficient, or a manifestation of 
interest group capture.  However, antitrust need not countenance restraints in 
which the effective decision makers are the market participants themselves.28 
 
Concerns for Federalism 
 
 Pulling in the opposite direction, the trimming of the federal regulatory 
agenda has been accompanied by a return to federalism -- i.e, to take 
preemptive regulatory power away from the federal government and restore it to 
the states.  This would seem to suggest more deference by federal antitrust 
tribunals to state regulation, and thus an expanded role for state action immunity. 
 
 Concerns for federalism were not particularly prominent in the Supreme 
Court's Parker decision.  Rather, the Court seemed to regard the regulation in 
question as enacted in the public interest.29  In sharp contrast, the first edition of 
the Areeda-Turner Antitrust Law treatise, published in 1978, seated the state 
action doctrine squarely within the authors' concerns for federalism.  Areeda and 
Turner argued that the "proper" grounds for state action immunity were twofold.  
First, there should not be Parker immunity "without adequate public supervision" 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic 
Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, 
Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 
75 Cal. L. Rev. 227 (1987). 
28.  See discussion infra. 
29.  See Parker, 317 U.S. at 346, 351-352.  On this point, see Delacourt & Zywicki, note 
27. 
of private conduct.30  Second, there must be "authorized state action clearly 
intended to displace antitrust law."31  The Supreme Court picked up these criteria 
almost verbatim in its Midcal Aluminum decision three years later, and since then 
"clear authorization" and "active supervision" have come to define the two 
elements for the state action doctrine, at least when the conduct in question is 
that of private parties.32 
 
 Thus it seems clear that, while the initial Parker v. Brown state action 
doctrine rested on ideas about regulatory supremacy rather than federalism, 
today that is no longer the case.  Since Midcal neither the Supreme Court nor the 
lower courts have indulged any presumption that state regulation is in the "public 
interest," or that it produces better outcomes than the antitrust laws would 
produce.  Rather, the foundation of the doctrine lies in discernment of the state's 
own commitment to regulate.  If that commitment is appropriately stated, then the 
federal tribunal should not intervene no matter what it may think of the merits of 
the regulation at issue. 
 
Growth of Multistate Markets; Spillovers 
 
 The enlargement of markets and internationalization of the economy that 
provided the backdrop for the expansion of federal regulatory power in the 1930s 
                                                 
30.  1 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law &&213 (1978).  The title of this 
Paragraph was "Proper Immunity Limits I: No Parker Immunity Without Adequate Public 
Supervision," and Areeda and Turner that: 
 
...a state may be free to determine for itself how much competition is desirable, provided 
that it substitutes adequate public control wherever it has substantially weakened 
competition. 
 
 ... [T]he adequate supervision criterion ensures that state-federal conflict will be avoided 
in those area in which the state has demonstrated its commitment to a program 
through its exercise of regulatory oversight.  At the same time, it guarantees that 
when the Sherman Act is set aside, private firms are not left to their own devices.  
Rather, immunity will be granted only when the state has substituted its own 
supervision for the economic constraints of the competitive market. 
 
id. at 72-73 (footnotes omitted). 
31.  See id., &214, which was titled "Proper Immunity Limits II: No Parker Immunity 
Without Authorized State Action Clearly Intended to Displace Antitrust Law." 
32.  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (Midcal), 445 U.S. 97 
(1980).  See 1 Antitrust Law &221f (3d).  Under the post-Midcal case law the conduct of 
private parties must be both authorized and supervised.  The conduct of the "state itself" is 
inherently authorized and need not be supervised.  The conduct of officials representing 
state subdivisions, such as municipalities or most agencies, must be authorized but need 
not be supervised.  For elaboration see 1 Antitrust Law &&221-227 (3d). 
and 1940s has not subsided.  To the contrary, the rise of electronic markets has 
only served to accelerate the pace at which markets have become at least 
national and often international or even global.  As a general proposition, 
regulation of large markets by small governments is inefficient because it results 
in excessive self dealing and protectionism.33 
 
Applications: McCarran-Ferguson and "State Action" 
 
McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Immunity: the Case for Repeal 
 
 When the McCarran-Fergson Act was passed in 1945 state regulation of 
insurance was significant, extending to such things as rates, coverage, and 
financial integrity.34  The South Eastern Underwriters case35 threatened to 
undermine state regulation by permitting federal antitrust to be inserted into a 
market that had traditionally been reserved for the states.  The first paragraph of 
Justice Black's opinion for the Court defined the issue: 
 
For seventy-five years this Court has held, whenever the question has been 
presented, that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution does not deprive 
the individual states of power to regulate and tax specific activities of 
foreign insurance companies which sell policies within their territories. 
Each state has been held to have this power even though negotiation and 
execution of the companies' policy contracts involved communications of 
information and movements of persons, moneys, and papers across state 
lines. Not one of all these cases, however, has involved an Act of 
Congress which required the Court to decide the issue of whether the 
Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power to regulate insurance 
transactions stretching across state lines. Today for the first time in the 
                                                 
33.  Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal 
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985). 
34.  See Robert H. Jerry, Understanding Insurance Law '21 (2d ed. 1996), noting that by 
1919 36 states had "departments" or commissions charged with regulating insurance.  By 
1930 these agencies had been given authority to collect information from insurers and to 
review at least some business decisions and approve some forms.  See also John G. Day, 
Economic Regulation of Insurance in the Untied States 18 (1970) (by 1944 there was 
substantial state agency involvement in the process of insurance rate regulation).  On 
specific instances of state regulation, see, e.g., American Druggists Fire Ins. Co. of 
Cincinnati, Ohio v. State Ins. Bd. of Okl., 184 Okla. 66, 84 P.2d 614 (1938).  See also 
Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W.2d 343 (1951); Caminetti v. Manierre, 23 
Cal.2d 94, 142 P.2d 741 (Cal. 1943); United Employers Cas. Co. v. Pearlman Auto Parts & 
Supply Co., 173 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943); English Freight Co. v. Knox, 180 S.W.2d 
633 (Tex.Civ.App. 1944). 
35.  United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
history of the Court that issue is squarely presented and must be 
decided.36 
 
 The South Eastern Underwriters case itself involved allegations of price-
fixing among a half dozen insurers serving several states, as well as an 
agreement to boycott rivals and force purchasers to deal only with the 
defendants.  The McCarran-Ferguson Act would have immunized the first of 
these claims, provided that insurance was adequately regulated, but its "boycott" 
exception would probably have denied immunity to the second.37 
 
 Notwithstanding its then recent decision in Parker the South Eastern 
Underwriters opinion took a much less accommodating attitude toward state 
regulation: 
 
 [I]t is argued at great length that virtually all the states regulate the 
insurance business on the theory that competition in the field of insurance 
is detrimental both to the insurers and the insured, and that if the Sherman 
Act be held applicable to insurance much of this state regulation will be 
destroyed. The first part of this argument is buttressed by opinions 
expressed by various persons that unrestricted competition in insurance 
results in financial chaos and public injury. Whether competition is a good 
thing for the insurance business is not for us to consider. Having power to 
enact the Sherman Act, Congress did so; if exceptions are to be written 
into the Act, they must come from the Congress, not this Court. 
 
 The argument that the Sherman Act necessarily invalidates many state 
laws regulating insurance we regard as exaggerated. Few states go so far 
as to permit private insurance companies, without state supervision, to 
agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates.  No states authorize 
combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate, and boycott 
competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged, and it cannot be 
that any companies have acquired a vested right to engage in such....38 
 
Congress then responded with the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which was intended 
to restore the state regulatory prerogative.  The Act exempted the insurance 
                                                 
36.  United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 434 (1944).   
37.  The Act contains an exception for boycotts.  See 15 U.S.C. '1013b: "Nothing 
contained in this chapter shall render the ... Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to 
boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation."  See 1 Antitrust 
Law &220 (3d). 
38.  Ibid. (emphasis added), citing Parker as an example of a situation where the state did 
authorize such combinations. 
industry from federal laws of general application, and included an antitrust 
exemption that applied if the insurance business was regulated by state law.39 
 
 In 1945, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, Congress 
apparently did not foresee subsequent developments in the antitrust state action 
doctrine that would have served to immunize many insurance restraints, provided 
that they were adequately regulated.  Indeed, the state action doctrine would 
have provided a much more balanced approach to the problem of ineffectual 
state insurance regulation. 
 
 One of the ironies of the McCarran-Ferguson Act is that it tends to 
immunize practices that pose a significant threat to competition, such as 
competitor agreements fixing rates or reducing policy coverage,40 but not various 
vertical practices that are almost certainly not antitrust violations at all.  By its 
terms the statute applies only to the "business of insurance," which involves such 
things as the making of rates or the determination of policy coverage.  On the 
other hand, purely vertical arrangements under which insurers provide 
prescription drugs or other non-insurance services or engage in peer review of 
providers are frequently held to fall outside the "business of insurance," and thus 
are non-immune.  The same thing is true of insurer efforts at cost control via 
limitations of such things as auto repair prices.41  In sum, the statute tends to 
immunize serious horizontal restraints while finding no immunity for vertical 
restraints that are far less likely to be anticompetitive. 
                                                 
39.  The Act provides that: 
 
 No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law 
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or 
which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates 
to the business of insurance:  Provided, That ... [the antitrust laws and FTC Act] 
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is 
not regulated by State law. 
 
15 U.S.C. '1012b. 
40.  See, e.g., Gilchrist v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (immunizing agreement among insurers to require use of inferior replacement 
crash parts in auto repair). 
41.  See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) (peer review not 
immune); Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979) (no 
immunity for health insurer's agreement with pharmacies setting maximum rates for 
prescriptions for its insureds).  See also Brillhart v. Mutual Med. Ins., Inc.., 768 F.2d 196, 
200 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (provider agreement between insurer and physicians; latter agreed 
to provide medical services to subscribers at price to be determined by insurance 
company); St. Bernard Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 618 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(contract limiting reimbursement of plaintiff for-profit hospital to average charges of non-
profit hospitals); Liberty Glass Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 607 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1979) (auto 
glass repairer challenged insurer's cost-control arrangements involving other repairers). 
 
 While the statute seems to allow for broader application of the antitrust 
laws to insurance than other federal provisions,42 the courts have not read it that 
way.  Further, the phrase "regulated by state law" in the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
has come to mean something quite different than the "authorization" and "active 
supervision" required by the state action doctrine.  To illustrate, suppose that the 
state has insurance regulation in place, but the general thrust of this regulation is 
to oppose horizontal agreements fixing insurance premiums.  In such a case one 
might say that a Sherman Act complaint alleging unlawful price fixing would be in 
furtherance of rather than inconsistent with the state's regulatory policy.  
Nevertheless, the courts generally agree that the Sherman Act complaint is pre-
empted.  The mere presence of state regulation is sufficient to oust the federal 
antitrust claim. 
 
 In addition, the courts have generally been satisfied with virtually any 
degree of regulation, and even the most superficial indicators of supervision.43  
They have suggested that the mere existence of an agency or official with 
insurance oversight is adequate regulation.44  The Ninth Circuit believes that the 
mere fact that the state has appointed an insurance commissioner and required 
him to approve all policies is sufficient.45  In another case it inferred sufficient 
                                                 
42.  The debates indicate that Congress intended to leave more room for antitrust 
enforcement against the insurance industry than for the application of other laws not 
explicitly directed at the insurance industry.  See e.g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1444 (remarks of Sen. 
Pepper), id. at 1484 (Sen. Murdock). 
43.  See Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1975) (Alabama 
statute prohibiting "all unfair methods of competition" sufficient regulation to create 
McCarran immunity); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972) ("there is nothing in the language of the McCarran 
Act or in its legislative history to support the thesis that the Act does not apply when the 
state's scheme of regulation has not been effectively enforced").  See also Gilchrist v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding immunity 
for alleged insurer agreement reducing quality of repair parts; noting that Florida, the most 
relevant state, regulated the general industry intensely, and that many states also regulate 
the use of non-OEM repair parts). 
44.  See, e.g., For example, FTC v. National Casualty 357 U.S. 560, 564-565 (1958), 
refused to inquire into how state regulatory provisions were applied, with the possible 
exception where the regulation was a "mere pretense."  Accord Ocean State Physicians 
Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 883 F.2d 1101, 1108-1109 (1st Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990); Workers Compensation Insurance, 867 F.2d 
1552, 1557-1558 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 920 (1989); Health Care Equalization 
Comm. v. Iowa Med. Socy., 851 F.2d 1020, 1029 (8th Cir. 1988). 
45.  Freier v. New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Proctor 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 308, 317 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 
(1982) (not disturbing district court finding that virtually any regulation specifically 
mentioning insurance industry will suffice). 
regulation from the fact that a state statute banned unfair or deceptive practices 
in the health insurance industry.46  The courts have not required authorization of 
the specific conduct that is the subject of the antitrust challenge.47  The Eighth 
Circuit has held that a statute giving the state power to "investigate" rates and 
methods of competition was sufficient regulation to support the immunity, even if 
there was no evidence that actual investigating was occurring.48 
 
 In sum, the McCarran-Ferguson immunity requires no "active supervision" 
of private conduct at all, and only the most general statement of authorization, 
certainly nothing like the authorization requirement in the state action doctrine. 
 
 While principles of federalism may require that federal antitrust authority 
yield on matters where a state has made clear its wish to regulate, no principle 
mandates such yielding to little more than naked private power.  One can protest, 
of course, that today many states regulate their insurance markets vigorously 
and are constantly on the lookout for abuses.  But in those situations repeal 
would not be harmful, for the state action immunity would protect the results. 
 
 Furthermore, the idea expressed by the Supreme Court in Paul v. 
Virginia49 that insurance is largely a matter of state contract law is not close to 
the reality we live in today.50  Insurance is very largely sold in multistate or even 
                                                 
46.  Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 
1287 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983). 
47.  E.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Socy. of the U.S., 503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975) (simple statute regulating unfair practices in 
insurance industry sufficient, regardless of "whether the... laws proscribe or permit the 
alleged acts of economic coercion in the issuance of insurance policies" challenged in this 
case). 
48.  Workers Compensation Insurance, 867 F.2d 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 
920 (1989).  A dissenting judge objected: "Given Minnesota's intentional deregulation of 
workers' compensation rates, I would find that Minnesota does not 'regulate' these rates for 
purposes of . . . McCarran-Ferguson. While the state did maintain a general regulatory 
presence in the field, there was no specific regulation targeted at the alleged practices at 
issue. . . ." Id. at 1569. 
49.  Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).  See discussion supra. 
50.  Indeed, the interstate character of the insurance industry was already clear in the 
1940s, when South Eastern Underwriters was decided.  See this description from Justice 
Black's opinion for the Court, 322 U.S. at 541-542: 
 
This business is not separated into 48 distinct territorial compartments which function in 
isolation from each other. Interrelationship, interdependence, and integration of 
activities in all the states in which they operate are practical aspects of the 
insurance companies' methods of doing business. A large share of the insurance 
business is concentrated in a comparatively few companies located, for the most 
part, in the financial centers of the East. Premiums collected from policyholders in 
national markets.  While this fact may not make state regulation unimportant, it 
exacerbates the possibility of socially harmful spillovers. 
 
 In sum, repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act need not have any harmful 
consequences for federalism or the competitive health of the insurance industry.  
Bona fide regulatory oversight will continue to qualify the industry for the state 
action exemption, provided that the authorization and supervision requirements 
are met. 
 
Reform of the Antitrust "State Action" Doctrine 
 
 The current Parker state action immunity doctrine could be improved in 
several ways.  First, too many courts interpret the authorization requirement far 
too broadly.  In Midcal the Supreme Court required "clear articulation" and 
"affirmative expression" of a state intent to authorize the "challenged restraint."51  
Writing a few years prior to Midcal, Areeda and Turner expressed this 
requirement as a "clear statement" rule that presumed lack of immunity unless 
the relevant statute stated its intent clearly.52 
                                                                                                                                                 
every part of the United States flow into these companies for investment. As 
policies become payable, checks and drafts flow back to the many states where the 
policyholders reside. The result is a continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse 
among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of policy 
obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are essential 
to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts. Individual policyholders living in 
many different states who own policies in a single company have their separate 
interests blended in one assembled fund of assets upon which all are equally 
dependent for payment of their policies. The decisions which that company makes 
at its home office--the risks it insures, the premiums it charges, the investments it 
makes, the losses it pays--concern not just the people of the state where the home 
office happens to be located. They concern people living far beyond the boundaries 
of that state. 
51.  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980). 
52.  See 1 Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law, note 30 at &214: 
 
the determination of both the meaning of state approval and the extent of state 
authorization must be subject to a clear statement requirement.  Adoption of a 
policy requiring a state to make a clear statement of it intention to supplant 
competition reconciles the interests of the states in adopting non-competitive 
policies with the strong national policy favoring competition, and is consistent with 
the canon of federal statutory construction that exemptions to the antitrust laws are 
not to be lightly inferred.  Where there is no other indication of the proper scope of 
an officer's authority or of the meaning of state approval, a clear statement 
requirement is the best approach, because it ensures that the strong federal policy 
embodied in the antitrust laws will not be set aside where not intended by the state, 
and yet also guarantees that the state will not be prevented by the antitrust laws 
alone from supplanting those laws as long as it makes its purpose clear.... 
 
 
 After a few years of restrictive interpretations of this requirement the 
Supreme Court loosened it up, finding in Hallie that it was sufficient if the restraint 
was a "foreseeable result" of the regulatory authorization.53  Since Hallie the 
trend in the lower courts has been to interpret state statutes generously so as to 
find authorization.  Indeed, the courts have gone so far as to infer clear 
articulation from such things as the granting of ordinary corporate powers -- 
inferring, for example, that a general grant of the corporate power to make 
contracts authorized a public hospital's anticompetitive exclusionary contracts.54 
 
 Other decisions have properly been much more restrictive.  One court 
very wisely rejected the argument that courts should infer:  
 
a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority. These are the 
enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of local government across 
the country gain basic corporate powers. To infer a policy to displace 
competition from, for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or 
other business forms would stand federalism on its head. A state would 
henceforth be required to disclaim affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the 
peril of creating an instrument of local government with power the state did 
                                                                                                                                                 
 The clear statement requirement does not prevent the state from indicating its interest, 
as it can always make its intent clear.  It merely ensures that the inertia in the 
system is used in the service of the federal interest in free competition. 
 
Id. at 91-92 (footnotes omitted). 
53.  Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985).  Accord City of Columbia 
& Columbia Outdoor Advertising v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 
(1991). 
54.  See Martin v Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996) (municipal 
hospital's exclusive contract with physician to supervise kidney disease center was 
foreseeable consequence of state statute authorizing such hospitals to contract for the 
provision of services, including entering management contracts, but not explicitly stating 
that such contracts could be exclusive); Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Co., LLC v. West 
Tennessee Healthcare, Inc., 2004-1 Trade Cases &74,344, 2004 WL 547215 (Feb. 27, 
2004) (authority to enter into contracts with physicians implied authority to enter into 
anticompetitive agreements).  See also See Recombinant DNA Technology and Patent 
Contract Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Ind. 1994), holding that a statute authorizing a 
university to "acquire by grant, purchase, gift, devise, lease, or by the exercise of the right 
of eminent domain, and ...  hold use, sell, lease, or dispose of any real or personal property 
necessary for the full exercise or convenient or useful for the carrying on of any of its 
powers. . . ." authorized it to agree with a private firm to obtain an exclusive patent license 
by fraud.  No doubt the court was impelled by serious doubts of any antitrust violation; but if 
there were one, a statute giving a university a general power to acquire, manage and 
dispose of property hardly includes anticompetitive agreements in violation of federal 
antitrust law as a foreseeable consequence. 
not intend to grant. The immediate practical effect would be the extension 
of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the teaching that local 
instruments of government are subject to the Sherman Act.55 
 
 Although Hallie permitted an inference of authorization to be drawn from 
foreseeability, the inference that the Supreme Court drew in that case was not a 
particularly long stretch.  The City of Eau Claire was accused of refusing to 
provide sewage treatment services to unincorporated areas around it unless 
these areas first agreed to be incorporated.  The authorizing provision that the 
City relied on expressly permitted the City to refuse to provide services to 
unincorporated areas,56 but it did not expressly authorize anticompetitive actions 
or antitrust violations.  Likewise, in Columbia the Supreme Court found it 
sufficiently foreseeable that a grant of power to regulate the land use process 
contemplated the power to control the type and placement of advertising 
billboards.57  In sharp contrast, all corporations are granted the power to enter 
into contracts, but this hardly expresses a "clear articulation" of the state's desire 
that they be permitted to enter into anticompetitive agreements.58 
 
 As a general rule ambiguities in state authorizing provisions should be 
construed against authorization.  This conclusion flows from the fact that the 
antitrust laws declare a clear national policy of preventing anticompetitive 
                                                 
55.  Surgical Care Center of Hammond v. Hosp. Svce. Dist., 171 F.3d 231, 235-236 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999).  The court refused to find authorization from 
legislation that gave a hospital the power to contract and to enter into joint ventures with 
other health providers.  As it noted, "[n]ot all joint ventures are anticompetitive. Thus, it is 
not the foreseeable result of allowing a hospital service district to form joint ventures that it 
will engage in anticompetitive conduct."  Accord Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope 
Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). 
56.  See Wis.Stat. '66.069(2)(c) (1981-1982), providing that a city providing a public 
utility: 
 
may by ordinance fix the limits of such service in unincorporated areas.  Such ordinance 
shall delineate the area within which service will be provided and the municipal 
utility shall have no obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated. 
 
Further, Wis.Stat. '144.07(1) (1981-1982) provided that the state's Department of 
Natural Resources may require a city to interconnect with surrounding areas; however, it 
also provided that such an order would be void if the outlying territory refused to become 
annexed to the city.  See Hallie,  471 U.S. at 41. 
57.  City of Columbia & Columbia Outdoor Advertising v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 
499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
58.  See the FTC's state action Task Force Report, which would inquire "whether the state 
has deliberately adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue."  FTC, 
Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003) at 50-51 (2003). 
restraints, and that most states declare a similar policy via their own antitrust 
laws or regulatory provisions.  As a result state and local government regulatory 
policy is painted on a canvas in which federal and state policies favoring 
competition form a clear background.  While the Parker doctrine rests on the 
premise that a state is free to deviate from this policy in specific situations if it 
chooses, such deviations should not be found absent a clear expression by the 
state that it desires to do so.59  When a state grants power to an inferior entity it 
presumably grants the power to do the thing contemplated, but not to do so 
anticompetitively.  For example, an authorization to a corporation to enter into 
contracts is not to be construed as an authorization to enter into price-fixing or 
other anticompetitive agreements unless the authorizing provision states so 
clearly. 
 
 The problem with the "active supervision" requirement has not been quite 
as severe since the Supreme Court's decision in Ticor Title60 establishing that 
active supervision requires actual government review of private conduct.61  
Nevertheless, there are still problem areas.  For example, there is much to be 
said for the FTC's suggestion that if a state regulatory agency is going to approve 
a particular instance of rate bureaus or other forms of regulatory price fixing it 
should issue a written opinion on the merits, supported by a set of fact findings 
that explain its decision.62  Such reasoned elaborations serve to provide 
transparency to the process and help ensure that agency decisions do not reflect 
simple private interest capture.63  This prong of the Midcal test requires that the 
                                                 
59.  When a state wishes to, its authorization can be very clear.  Consider this Georgia 
statute: 
 
It is declared by the General Assembly of Georgia that in the exercise of powers specifically 
granted to them by law, local governing authorities of cities and counties are acting 
pursuant to state policy. . . .  This chapter is intended to articulate clearly and 
express affirmatively the policy of the State of Georgia that in the exercise of such 
powers, such local governing authorities shall be immune from antitrust liability to 
the same degree and extent as enjoyed by the State of Georgia." 
 
O.C.G.A. '36-19-1 (April 4, 1984).  See McCallum v. City of Athens, 976 F.2d 649, 655 
(11th Cir. 1992) ("by enacting [this provision] Georgia unequivocally revealed that it 
contemplated that its municipalities might engage in anticompetitive conduct."). 
60.  FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
61.  However, see Comment, William J. Martin, State Action Antitrust immunity for 
Municipally Supervised Parties, 72 Univ.Chi.L.Rev. 1079 (2005) (arguing that the courts 
analyze claims of state supervision rigorously, while applying a much more lenient standard 
to local government supervision). 
62.  See Task Force Report, note 58 at 55. 
63.  See Timothy J. Muris, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol'y 443, 448 (2005). 
state both "have and exercise ultimate authority"64 so that it can be said that the 
resulting decision is a product of "deliberate state intervention, not simply by 
agreement among private parties."65 
 
 Whenever we consider the values of federalism and the respective roles 
of state and federal regulation, some attention must be given to the problem of 
spillovers, or extraterritorial effects.  It is one thing to approve an anticompetitive 
state regulatory scheme when the burden falls substantially on that state's own 
residents.  But federalism does not require federal authority to permit states to 
export anticompetitive regulatory schemes.  Under the current formulation of the 
state action exemption, extraterritorial impact of state regulatory schemes is not 
even regarded as relevant.  To be sure, antitrust is not the only vehicle for 
addressing these problems. Anticompetitive state regulatory schemes that have 
too severe an impact on interstate commerce can and have been struck down 
under the Commerce Clause.66 
 
 The Federal Trade Commission's Report of its State Action Task Force is 
quite concerned about extraterritorial spillovers of anticompetitive state 
regulation.67  As that document observes, the spillover problem has long been 
recognized in the academic literature.68  However, the Report then noted only 
Parker itself as a decision that involved significant spillovers.69 
                                                 
64.  Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 106 (1988).  See 1A Antitrust Law &226c (3d). 
65.  Ticor, 504 U.S. at 634-636. 
66.  E.g., Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885 (2005) (ban on out-of-state wine shipments 
violates commerce clause); South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) 
(discriminatory franchise tax levied on out-of-state corporations violated commerce clause); 
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (use tax exemption that favored in-
state sellers of natural gas did not violate either commerce clause or equal protection 
clause); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (striking down North Carolina tax on 
residents' ownership of out of state corporate shares); Associated Indus. of Missouri v. 
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (striking down tax on value of goods purchased outside the 
state but consumed, used, or stored inside the state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 
340 U.S. 349 (1951) (statute prohibited sale of milk as pasteurized unless processed within 
five miles of Madison).   
67.  FTC, Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003) at 40-
44, 56-57 (2003). 
68.  Id., citing Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-
Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 Tex.L.Rev. 1203 (1997); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State 
Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 Cal.L.Rev. 227 (1987); 
David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity, State Action and Federalism, 
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 Harv. J.L.& Pub. Pol'y 293 (1994); Einer Elhauge, 
The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv.L.Rev. 668 (1991); John E. Lopatka, State action 
and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53 Fordham L.Rev. 23 (1984); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L.&Econ. 23 (1983); 
 
 Under the state action doctrine in its current form spillovers are simply 
irrelevant to the question of antitrust illegality.  If the state has sufficiently 
articulated its wish to displace the antitrust laws and if private conduct is 
adequately supervised, then it does not matter how much the regulatory program 
in question injures those outside the jurisdiction of the state or local government 
imposing the regulation.  As a consequence judicial records are not developed so 
as to highlight spillover effects.  A coherent doctrine of spillovers and its inclusion 
as a state action immunity requirement will therefore require some new directions 
in case development. 
 
 But inadequate factual development in the existing case law is hardly the 
only problem.  The most serious difficulty is administrative.  The "clear 
articulation" and "active supervision" prongs of the state action doctrine are 
designed to promote rapid and fairly easy disposition of antitrust challenges to 
state and local government.  Ideally, "articulation" can be assessed by looking at 
a state's statutes, or perhaps legislative history, regulations, or occasionally case 
law.  Generally these things can be judicially noticed, making the authorization 
requirement an ideal candidate for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  
"Active supervision" can be a little more difficult, but need not be.  Often the 
public records provide ample evidence of supervision or the lack of it.  As a 
result, state action immunity questions are often resolved on motions to dismiss. 
 
 In contrast, measurement of "spillovers" in the context of antitrust litigation 
would at best be an empirically challenging exercise.  First, every state and local 
regulation has some spillover.  For example, out-of-state visitors may have to use 
the trash disposal,70 taxicab,71 hospital,72 or ambulance services73 that are 
                                                                                                                                                 
Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust 
Policy, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985); William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy 
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 St. John's L.Rev. 361 (2000). 
69.  See Report, note 58 at 40.  The Report also noted the example given in Lafayette 
that "a municipality conceivably might charge discriminatorily higher rates to such captive 
customers outside its jurisdiction without a cost-justified basis." City of Lafayette v. La. 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978).  But the Report did not suggest that 
significant spillovers were at issue in Lafayette. 
70.  E.g., Southern Disposal, Inc. v. Texas Waste Management, Inc., 161 F.3d 1259 (10th 
Cir. 1998); Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987). 
71.  Charley's Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc.., 810 F.2d 869, 875 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Independent Taxicab Drivers' Employees v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 760 
F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1986); Campbell v. City of Chicago, 
823 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1987); Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. 
Tex. 1978); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994).  Most of these 
involved exclusive licenses for things such as airport pickup, often from large international 
airports such as DFW (Woolen), Houston (Independent Taxicab Drivers), or O'Hare 
(Campbell).  None of the decisions mentioned interstate spillover effects. 
subject to a challenged restraint.  Or the resale price maintenance scheme at 
issue in Midcal almost certainly affected out-of-state wine purchasers.74  But 
unless we want to jettison the state action exemption altogether, these spillovers 
are going to have to be regarded as de minimis, or as not sufficiently substantial 
to invoke any exception to the immunity. 
 
 Beyond that, we certainly cannot expect litigants to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis tailored after the Kaldor-Hicks model of economic efficiency, asking 
whether the harmful impact on out-of-state interests was larger than the benefits 
conferred on in-state residents.  Doing so would move the state action immunity 
from one of relatively simple disposition on motions to dismiss or early summary 
judgment into a litigation nightmare involving multiple experts and costly 
empirical studies.  It must be borne in mind that often these disputes are 
relatively small in the world of antitrust cases, involving such things as a single 
physician's challenge to the policies of a public hospital, or a small trash removal 
firm's or taxicab operator's challenge to an exclusive franchise.  Further, public 
defendants such as municipalities lack the resources for costly litigation. 
 
 To be sure, one can imagine egregious situations in which the impact of 
state regulation falls almost entirely on out-of-state interests, but then it seems 
the dormant Commerce Clause would be sufficient to handle the problem.75 
 
 It is largely for this reason that the Antitrust Law treatise has played down 
the spillover problem, even though I was one of the authors cited in the FTC's 
Report as stating the spillover concern.76  Yes, it is a concern, but the most 
fundamental piece of cost-benefit analysis of all is an assessment whether the 
benefits of taking extraterritorial spillovers into account will be justified by the very 
considerable increase in costs likely to affect most state action cases. 
 
 The authors of the FTC's Report appear to be aware of this, although they 
did not explicitly articulate the concern.  The Report argues that "overwhelming" 
                                                                                                                                                 
72.  Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Company, LLC v. West Tennessee Healthcare, Inc., 
414 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2005); Surgical Care Center of Hammond v. Hosp. Svce. Dist., 
171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999); Martin v Memorial Hospital at 
Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996). 
73.  A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. County of Monterey, 90 F.3d 333 (9th Cir. 1996); Gold 
Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1003 (1985). 
74.  California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
75.  See the decisions cited supra. 
76.  See FTC Report of the State Action Task Force, note 58 at (2003) at 43 n. 186, citing 
Hovenkamp & John A. Mackerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 
UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1985). 
state spillovers be taken into account in deciding the immunity question.77  The 
limitation to "overwhelming" is undoubtedly intended to address the fact finding 
problem, but even so, a broad factual inquiry will be required.  The authors then 
add in a footnote: 
 
 When the degree of spillover is more marginal, and difficult to measure, 
prudence and a desire for legal rules with ex ante predictability counsel 
against giving significant weight to interstate spillovers.  But where the 
benefits of a given anticompetitive restriction accrue overwhelmingly to 
residents of the state implementing the restriction, and the harms fall 
overwhelmingly on residents of other states, then the considerations 
behind both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the federal antitrust laws 
are at their height, and the case for judicial recognition of those spillovers 
is at its strongest.78 
 
Still, one wonders whether there will be restraints that meet this test for antitrust 
purposes, but would not be excluded in any event by the dormant commerce 
clause.79 
 
 Finally, antitrust tribunals need to be somewhat more sensitive to 
substantive issues of antitrust policy in deciding questions that implicate the state 
action immunity.  Too many cases have required lengthy appellate litigation, 
sometimes even to the Supreme Court, when the case could have been 
disposed of far more readily on antitrust grounds.  The FTC has somewhat 
ambiguously suggested a "tiered" approach to the state action immunity, with a 
clearer state articulation of purpose to displace the antitrust laws required as the 
restraint becomes more anticompetitive.80  While one can appreciate the 
                                                 
77.  Report, note 58 at 56. 
78.  Id. at 57 n. 242. 
79.  One possibility is municipal restraints where the impact of the restraint falls outside of 
the municipality but within the state.  In that case, however, the issue is probably best left to 
state law. 
80.  See John T. Delacourt & Todd Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on 
the Proper Role of Government, 72 Antitrust L.J. 1075, 1089-1090 (2005), referring to the 
State Action Task Force Report, note 58 at 12.  Delacourt & Zywicki suggest, id. at 1089: 
 
Pursuant to such a tiered approach, the level of clear articulation required would increase 
or decrease, depending on the nature of the anticompetitive conduct at issue. This 
approach reflects that fact that, the more serious the nature of the anticompetitive 
conduct, the more likely it is to restrain trade. Thus, it is logical to assume that the 
alleged beneficiary of a restraint will be more likely to engage in more serious 
anticompetitive conduct as such conduct is also more likely to be successful. 
Increasing the level of clear articulation required to match the seriousness of the 
alleged anticompetitive conduct should therefore create at least a rough link 
between the defendant's incentives and a grant of state action protection, with the 
underlying concern, this approach overly complicates an already complex 
doctrine.  It would be far better to require that articulation be clear in all cases, 
under a plain statement rule.  When concerns for competition seem relatively 
modest, rather than watering down the articulation requirement litigants and 
courts would do better to go straight to the merits.  The previously mentioned 
Boulder decision, which was litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, provides 
a good example.  Uncertain about the best course for future development of its 
cable television system the City of Boulder enacted a moratorium on further 
expansion of its incumbent cable television provider while it considered whether 
such expansion was preferable to new entry by other providers.  The complaint 
should have been dismissed on the pleadings.  First, the City of Boulder was not 
a participant in the cable television market at all.  Second, the plaintiff was 
claiming an antitrust right to expand its monopoly franchise rather than permitting 
the city to inaugurate competition.81 
 
 The state action immunity is essential in situations where state regulation 
endorses collusion or similar practices that are almost certainly antitrust 
violations when committed in the private sector.  It is completely unnecessary 
when a state or local government regulates in a way that never gives rise to an 
antitrust cause of action to begin with.  The tougher cases are a relatively small 
number in the middle -- arguable rule of reason violations but a colorable case for 
state authorization and active supervision.  With respect to these I do not believe 
that a more lenient test for immunity is the right approach; the state either 
declares an intention to displace the antitrust laws or it doesn't.  In most such 





 Federal antitrust policy has always been delimited by concerns for 
federalism.  While the role of the states in regulating their own economies is not 
as significant today as it was when the Sherman Act was passed, that is no 
reason for jettisoning our concerns to preserve a federal system of economic 
regulation, provided that doing so is defensible on policy grounds and not too 
costly.  When a state regulates well, appropriately limiting the range of private 
entrepreneurial discretion, then federal antitrust must ordinarily stand aside, even 
though the federal decision maker thinks that the state regulatory regime in 
question is poorly designed or inefficient.  However, concerns for federalism do 
                                                                                                                                                 
result that the "clear articulation" requirement will be most rigorous where the 
defendant is most likely to engage in anticompetitive conduct. 
81.  The plaintiff also alleged a conspiracy between the City and the cable company that 
wanted to enter the market to substitute the latter for the former.  However, no competition 
is diminished when one monopoly franchise is substituted for another one, and such 
plaintiffs ordinarily lack standing.  See 2 Antitrust Law &348e (2d ed. 2000). 
not require the federal antitrust tribunal simply to cave in to purely private 
business discretion. 
 
 To that end, the McCarran-Ferguson insurance immunity is long overdue 
for repeal.  That statute does virtually no good and creates an immunity whose 
social cost in the form of increased collusion is undoubtedly very high.  By 
contrast, the Parker state action doctrine is salvageable with much more modest 
fixes that leave its basic structural requirements intact. 
 
 
